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ABSTRACT
Health and beauty are the most important physical ideals. This paper seeks to compare and
contrast these ideals, based on a value theory of human abilities. Health is comprehended as a
potential ability to act grounded in bodily functions. Beauty is explained as a symbolising
reference to happiness, physical beauty as a combination of organic orientation to purpose and
virtuous orientation to action. Physical beauty is the implicit symbolic expression of mental and
physical health. This teleological theory is tested and exemplified using current stereotypes
such as youthfulness, slimness and shapeliness.
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I. ABILITIES AND VALUES
We seem to be on the threshold of a new era in which the biological sciences
have an increasing power to design the human body, and that against a
background of modern medical progress which, seen from an historical
perspective, is duly impressive anyway. To date, medicine has always been
geared towards illness. Traditionally its task has been to alleviate physical
suffering caused by disease, or to prevent suffering in the first place. Medicine
in the future, however, will increasingly become oriented towards design. Its
task will be to design the body according to particular ideals, and of all these
ideals, health and vitality will only be two, maybe not even the most
important. The first harbingers of this shift are already visible in the fields of
sports medicine, cosmetic surgery, prenatal diagnostics and different types of
geriatric medicine, as for example treatment of the menopause with hormones.
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In view of this redistribution of the importance of medical tasks, or of this new
branch of ‘‘bioshaping disciplines’’, the urgency of deliberating our body
ideals is obvious.
Body ideals exist as norms pertaining to medical health, as well as
perceptions of fitness and well-being extending beyond health. They also exist
in our notions of physical beauty. According to popular opinion, health and
beauty do not have very much in common, except for both being ideal physical
states. They are actually very closely connected. Both health and beauty are
ideal physical states deriving their function from within a common normative
framework, namely our understanding of the ‘‘good life’’. Since even popular
opinion deems both health and beauty important for a good life, this claim may
on first sight not appear to be particularly risky, and could even be considered
trite. And yet I am not simply placing health and beauty in the normative
framework of the good life conceptually or definitionally, but argumentatively.
I believe, to put it somewhat drastically, that the ethics of the good life can tell
us, normatively and as regards content, what health and beauty are.
The hypothesis that health and beauty are thus linked is sure to be doubted
by medics and philosophers alike. The best way to confirm it would be to work
out a detailed philosophical theory. Since, however, health and beauty are
extraordinarily comprehensive and complex phenomena, even the detailed
comments within this article will fall predictably short of this requirement.
Because I am unable here to give a satisfyingly detailed foundation to my
claims, I would like to start by naming my general reasons why health and
beauty, or more precisely physical health and beauty, have to be connected as
evaluative phenomena. Our everyday views (including those related to
medicine and the cultural sciences) towards health and beauty are
diametrically opposed in one point. We presume health to be biologically
and therefore ultimately objectively anchored in the constitution of the human
(or animal) body. Beauty is something perceived, is subject to many social and
individual influencing factors, and as such not comparably ‘‘objective’’.
Medical evaluations of health and disease are basically agreed throughout
history and across cultures; not even experts agree in their evaluations of
beauty and ugliness, which have changed throughout the ages and which differ
between cultures.
Put very simply, we are generally ‘‘naturalists’’ with regard to health and
‘‘social constructivists’’ with regard to beauty. The mere introduction of these
terms shows, however, that they cannot be totally mutually exclusive.
Naturalistic theories about central human characteristics are problematic
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because they tend to disregard human creativity. ‘‘Naturalism’’ means, after
all, the reduction of human characteristics to given characteristics – and
necessarily ignores any new and different creation of these characteristics.
Socio-constructive theories are subject to the opposite tendency to overvalue
social creation and neglect the natural productive conditions of human
self-creation.
In order to circumnavigate both dangers, it seems a good idea to link the
naturalistic and socio-constructive elements, not forgetting that they may still
be weighted very differently, depending on the topic. It seems obvious that
health is more ‘‘naturalistic’’ than beauty, that beauty is more socially
‘‘constructed’’ than health. But this is only true in general terms: some
diseases (hysteria, anorexia) are well known to be dependent on time and
society, and some perceptions of beauty (height, size) are well known to be
historically almost universal.1
All the same, a hybrid natural-social view requires suitable categories in
which its naturalistic assumptions are formulated. These assumptions should
be conceptualized in a manner which does not distort, but which attempts to
explain the socio-historical changeability of the phenomena, or at least
contributes to its explanation. However such categories are to be exhaustively
formulated, the concept of abilities will play an essential role. I maintain that
‘‘human abilities’’ represents a category of natural characteristics without
which particular human traits could neither be explained nor understood.
This theory, which I share with several contemporary philosophers,2
requires more precision in two ways: firstly, conceptual accuracy about what
abilities actually are and, secondly, accuracy as regards content, i.e., which
abilities do we wish to speak about? In the first sense, a differentiation
between functions and abilities seems important. Aristotle and several Neo-
Aristotelians (like Nussbaum) speak of abilities as functions, emphasising
the natural determinateness of ability. In order to underline the specifically
human, namely self-reflecting and autonomous quality of abilities, Nussbaum
then additionally speaks of capabilities. In my opinion, this divides the line in
the wrong place. A plausible and clear distinction, on the other hand, seems to
be that between natural physical/mental functions as opposed to actions. And
talk of human actions necessitates talk about human abilities, too. In this
sense, ‘‘abilities’’ would always be abilities to act, i.e., the abilities involved in
action itself or which the components of action pre-require.
Everyday language usage is more comprehensive with regard to this linking
of abilities to actions, and therefore more vague. We speak, for example, of the
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ability to hear or see, which could mean both the organic function and
the ability applied actively and consciously to hear or see something
(intentionally). A functional description can thus be used so widely that it
not only includes the purpose of particular organs, but also conscious action.
Observing (intentionally) and the mere processing of the light rays into a
three-dimensional picture (non-intentionally) would then both be functional
abilities, abilities subsumed by the generic term ‘‘function’’. We may thus
distinguish between a functional and an action-related concept of ability, the
first of which appears to be the more comprehensive of the two. An ability to
act may be classed as a function, but not vice versa. In order to avoid
functional-reductive naturalism, I shall adhere to my concept of ability as
action-related, even though it is clear that from a purely terminological point
of view ‘‘abilities’’ cannot be limited to the ability to act.
In a narrower sense, disregarding intention, abilities also have a functional
side to them, as is shown by the intentions themselves. The ability to form an
intention is, on the one hand, an ability controlled by intention – intentions
are formed intentionally, are thus a type of action; on the other hand, it
presupposes a non-intentional ability, i.e., a functional ability in the narrower
sense. This presupposed or inclusive ability comprises at least the ability of
the brain to provide the resources of the conscious mind required in order to
form intentions (intentionally) at all. In a differentiated view of non-conscious
and therefore not intentionally controlled presuppositions for the formation of
intentions (such as unconscious desires, habits, instincts), these too would
belong to the group of functional abilities. Since we speak of abilities in
connection with non-human organisms, it would be artificial not to use this
term for human beings.
Within the framework of the action-related concept of ability, intentions
and actions are interdependent. If an intention is involved, then so is an action,
since we cannot intend things which we cannot causally influence. One could
be sceptical towards the conclusion that intentions and actions are inextricably
linked only because actions require bodily movements, whereas mental
actions do not include any. And yet the linking of actions to bodily movements
(‘‘basic actions’’ (Danto, 1965)) is not crucial, and it seems reasonable to talk
of ‘‘actions of the mind’’. Accordingly, abilities are always the ability to
achieve something which is to be achieved through intentional action (see also
Hornsby, 1980, chaps. 1–3).
Let me now try to be more concrete regarding these abilities to act: which
ones are we talking about? According to the Aristotelian tradition, these
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abilities are basically the ones to be found in a ‘‘typical human being’’. And
they are abilities without which the ‘‘good life’’, as we humans understand it,
is impossible. What are ‘‘human’’ abilities, i.e., abilities typical for human
beings? Even if we take them as meaning typical abilities to act, in line with
the above explanation, this still does not mean they have to be ones possessed
only by human beings. Superior mammals are also capable of action, and it is
not important in this context whether their actions are different from those of
human beings in every case. ‘‘Typical’’ just means typical for human beings,
without having to be typical only for human beings.
Faced with defining concrete abilities, the best solution since Aristotle,
proposed by many writers, has been an ‘‘open list’’. An open list would
include abilities such as thought and perception, communication and
argument, sentiment, concern and love, work and production, imagination
and play. The list is open in its own patent way. In principle, ability after
ability can be added, the list is never closed. And – in the same way – the
abilities can always be described in different ways, linked differently. This
does not mean that our types of ability are endless. This principal patency is a
consequence of human creativity, which may in itself be an ability open to
endless description, but which is always structurally bound as well.
In some ways this openness of the human abilities list counters the
frequently raised objection that natural abilities cannot be the basis of ethics or
the good life because biological facts (like abilities) cannot as facts be values
and cannot therefore be good. The answer to this comes in two parts. Firstly,
abilities are not themselves facts, but facilitate facts, plus of course values or
goods. Abilities are potentials to act, and potentials are not facts, for the
simple reason that they cannot be described exhaustively.3 Secondly, every
ability necessarily has an ideal form, without which it cannot be defined. For
example, any mention of extinguishing fires insinuates fire extinguishing in its
ideal form. Realisation of this ideal form is to strive towards a good. The
concept of ability therefore unites what in other terminologies appears to be
impossible: certain characteristics may be both naturally given and ideal or
good.
A theory of body ideals requires the inclusion of two further observations
about abilities as comprehended above, referring to the two ‘‘ends’’ of
abilities: their origins from human biological facts and their qualities as
values. Firstly, abilities require functions, being taken to mean physical/
mental functions. It is obvious that we could not act if we did not have the
relevant functional abilities at our disposal within our bodies. Thus, functions
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facilitate particular abilities to act and, by the same token, abilities are limited
by functions. The relationship between the two is flexible, but not arbitrary.
The ‘‘scope of ability’’ open to human beings is laid down by the functions of
the human body.4 An appropriate relationship between functions and abilities
will therefore always be a precondition for any attempt to be more clear about
body ideals.
Secondly, if the appropriate normative conceptual level for human
characteristics is the level of abilities, then all values possible to man are
anchored in abilities or, to put it another way, they are nothing other than
abilities in their ideal forms. The adequate value theory is in one sense
‘‘monistic’’, attributing values to human abilities, and in another sense
‘‘pluralistic’’, heeding various abilities, and open abilities at that. Health,
beauty and morality are often taken to be completely separate value
categories, representing value judgements which are mutually incommensu-
rable. According to an ability-based value theory, they may be linked to
different abilities, but they are also linked to each other regarding the abilities
of every one single individual. Let us take a more precise look at this.
The goals or themes of these three value categories could be described as
follows: vitality as the goal of health, harmony of beauty and consideration for
others as the goal of morality. Functions and abilities connected with vitality,
or simply the preservation of life, are well known to us on an everyday basis,
even if that relationship is difficult to define in precise terms, as we shall see
shortly. Abilities aimed at ‘‘harmony’’ remain unclear, as this whole goal itself
is unclear and poorly defined. Later on I shall propose a slightly less formal
analysis. Consideration for others is certainly linked to abilities such as
concern, sympathy and communication. It is ethically debatable, however,
how these abilities are inter-related and whether they sufficiently constitute
morality, or whether something like ‘‘self-interest’’ or ‘‘practical reason’’ has
to be added. For purposes of simplification I shall call the ability aimed at
morality ‘‘practical reason’’ and leave its exact contents open. In the narrower
sense of the word, i.e., relating to others, we can certainly leave morality aside
in our analysis of the issues surrounding body design.5
Assuming that health is goal-linked with vitality, it is easy to see which
form a more detailed discussion on health would take. Vitality can either be
seen in a narrower sense, in which case a biological/functional theory will be
favoured, or in a broader sense, in which case a theory of abilities is more
likely to be favoured. Although in principle the biological/functional level can
be abstracted from others, it seems inappropriate with a view to phenomena
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like health and disease. Both are states not merely of the body, but of the entire
human being in question, i.e., a particular human being’s self-reflective
relationship should be taken into account in any analysis of these two states.
From this point of view, a theory of abilities seems altogether more
appropriate, although it would, of course, have to include bodily functions.
Because the self-reflective relationship, for example in the form of self-
interpretation, is not as objective regarding abilities as it is regarding physical
functions, it is not easy to formulate a theory of this kind.
It is far less easy to see which form a more detailed discussion of beauty
would take, especially physical beauty. Harmony as a goal is really just a
keyword taken to provide orientation for such further discussion. It seems
important that this goal is a kind of meta-goal, or that beauty is a characteristic
of other characteristics, for example of the relationship between other
characteristics. This is in line with the impossibility of defining abilities
geared directly towards or even connected with beauty. As an ultimate
explanation for beauty, the ‘‘aesthetic sense’’ postulate is just as fruitless for
all things beautiful as the ‘‘moral sense’’ postulate is for all things morally
imperative. Beauty is always an extra, crowning something else. In my quest
to develop an explanation, I shall commit myself to Stendhal’s famous
hypothesis: beauty as a symbolisation of happiness or the good life. The idea
behind this hypothesis is that beauty comes into play wherever the good life
acquires a concrete form or is anticipated.
I shall attempt below to put this theory into more concrete terms, in
particular for physical beauty. Because physical beauty, like health, is also
linked to functions and abilities, these elements, as well as their relationship to
each other in a healthy state, must first be made more clear. In some ways,
physical beauty presupposes, but is not meant to be identified with physical
health. In order to have a better understanding of physical beauty, we therefore
need to understand health, too.
II. HEALTH AS A POTENTIAL ABILITY TO ACT
What is the relationship between the functions of the human body and our
abilities to act, seen normatively? This somewhat ideosyncratically for-
mulated question takes up the point of contention within a recent debate
of several years raging between a large number of medical philosophers.6 My
formulation picks up on one of the views central to the debate: I, like
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C. Boorse, initially assume that disease could be interpreted as a functional
disorder. Rather than restricting disease solely to the functional level like
Boorse, however, I advocate interpreting it as including abilities. Overall my
proposal is this: that we comprehend disease as a disturbance of function-
based abilities.
In order to defend this definition adequately, one has to show firstly that
functions and abilities differ with regard to health/disease; secondly, that
neither of these two terms could ever provide a satisfactory explanation
reductively, but that both are required; thirdly that in this reciprocal rela-
tionship, abilities seem to outweigh. The second and third of these points not
only oppose Boorse’s claim that functions form the reductive element in the
explanation, but also oppose the view long shared by him and others that a
broader definition of health has to take subjective feelings into account, for
example suffering.7 Talk of abilities does not exclude such subjective states,
even (depending on the type of ability) partially including them, but instead
encompasses an internal objectifiability lacking in mere wishes and pains.
My presentation thus far may be clear enough concerning abilities, but has
left quite open what functions are meant to be. A precise analysis of functions
is controversial (see Boorse, 2001) and under one reading they would range in
the proximity of abilities. I shall return to this shortly. In examining why
abilities should be taken into consideration at all, we should address Boorse’s
attempts to interpret disease purely as a functional disorder (1975; 1977; 1987;
1997). The basic idea behind this attempt is ‘‘biomedical’’ in the literal sense.
The biological-evolutionary history of the human race has inscribed in
the human body a wealth of systematically ordered functions; modern medi-
cal science takes this model of bodily functions as its chief orientation.
Because this model provides not only biologically established functions,
but also statistically ascertained normal standards, it is also known as the
‘‘biostatistic’’ model of disease (see Boorse, 1997, p. 4).
This model does not cover certain types of disease known as ‘‘universal’’ or
‘‘structural’’, as for example widespread caries or cardiac right-sidedness.
These diseases cannot be described in functional terms, and neither do they
play a significant role in the overall class of diseases. Clearly a functional
disorder must also be based on endogenic causes and not on external factors
such as a lack of oxygen or excess air pressure. Accepting these limitations,
disease can be specified in terms of biology and statistics as follows: on the
one hand through ‘‘species design’’, the assumption of a patent and inter-
systematically ordered functionality of all bodily elements, at the top of their
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functional pyramid geared towards the evolutionary goals of survival and
reproduction; on the other hand through an evaluation of the efficiency of
bodily functions ‘‘typical for reference classes.’’ The basic idea here is that the
functional constitution of an individual organism is interpreted by comparing
it to the representative efficiency of a relevant group. Groups are formed
according to age and sex, sometimes race, and comparisons are, of course,
only made within the same species. (Although this definition of disease can be
applied to all other species, too.)
This, then, is Boorse’s definition of disease. ‘‘Health’’ is defined negatively,
as the absence of disease. Health and disease are opposing predicates. This
minimalistic comprehension of health is still preferable to the very broad
definition put forward by the WHO, identifying health as happiness and well-
being.8 One problem with this is that positive, i.e. enhanced health cannot be
specified or isolated as such (see Boorse, 1977, pp. 566–572; 1987, p. 370;
Schramme, 2000, pp. 101–104). The problem is really one of finding a
statistically ascertainable norm, which will inevitably involve a certain degree
of arbitrariness.
Two aspects in Boorse’s proposal are mutually conditioned: the value
neutrality and theoretical character of his definition. In clinical terms,
medicine is a practical science intent on treating disease in accordance with its
subjective manifestations. It focusses on practical success within a framework
of socio-culturally encountered and interpreted symptoms. In contrast, the
biostatistical definition touches only on the theoretical aspect of medicine, for
which pathological studies of the (usually dead) human body stand. Pathology
is not only able to study individual bodily functions to any degree of deviation
from the normal state – however slight – and without having to condense them
to an overall organic deficit; it can also totally abstract from subjective patient
evaluations, the patient usually being dead. In this sense the value neutrality of
disease seen biostatistically can be conceded, assuming a few weak evaluative
presuppositions.9 It is not a practical way of grasping disease, it has to be said.
And a ‘‘practical’’ definition of disease is surely of primary importance to the
very genuinely practical field of medicine. Value neutrality, on which so much
emphasis is placed, is gained at the expense of any practical relevance for
everyday medicine. Medicine is practice, not theory.
To what extent is a biostatistical view of disease practically irrelevant
though? Some philosophers (Hesslow, 1993) have opted for the radical retort:
completely. Boorse himself is of the opinion that functional disorder is a
necessary condition for a practical understanding of disease, so that the task
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remaining would be the finding of a ‘‘disease-plus’’ concept (1997, p. 55).
Others, like Nordenfelt (1987; 1993), reject this necessary condition, for-
mulating instead a disease concept completely independent of functional
disorder. In my opinion, the solution lies in linking the last two proposals,
which are only mutually exclusive on the surface. This is important because
the biostatistical concept, even in its extended form, guarantees the objectifi-
ability of disease. The practical significance this objectifiability actually has
becomes clear if we take a look at the problems surrounding a pragmatism
without principles, as advocated by G. Hesslow, for example.
Hesslow attempts to demonstrate that in the three most important medical
contexts – the meriting of medical treatment, insurance cover and criminal
liability – the mere assumption that certain physical/mental states can be
‘‘subjectively undesirable’’ is in normative terms totally sufficient for the
presence of disease. As Hesslow sees it, since disease states cannot be
objectified within the practical contexts of medicine, it would be better to give
up talk of disease altogether and simply replace this deceptively objective
parameter with what (from the point of view of the patient) is practically
desirable or to be avoided wherever possible. Medical treatments should not
be oriented towards restoring the body to its natural state, but rather to a state
desirable to the patient. Hesslow believes the orientation inherent in all this
seemingly objective talk about disease to be superfluous and even damaging.
Whilst this attack on the theoretical concept of health has arguments to
support it, they are at best those connected with the unrealistic nature of the
biostatistical concept. This concept’s greatest weakness appears to lie in its
inability to evaluate functional disorders as experienced subjectively by
patients themselves in terms of disease. The goals of survival and reproduction
postulated by evolutionary biology are much too general for an individual
patient, and they also presuppose a natural historical environment which is no
longer relevant to modern-day life. Moreover, it is doubtful whether all
interlocking bodily functions can be evaluated as contributing to these goals.
Turning this argument on its head, not all disorders per se can be functional
disorders of the entire organism (for more detail see Pawelzik, 1990; 1999, pp.
49–63). The biostatistical model alone can therefore not evaluate functional
disorders in individual patients with any practical relevance. Conceding this
criticism, this does not disqualify some other, or even all other attempts to
objectify disease.
Incidentally, the claim that medicine could fulfil its social tasks just as
well or even better without an objective understanding of disease is highly
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implausible. There is no reason to believe that society would be able to agree
on the ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ consequences of a particular medical treatment
without resorting to objectifiable criteria for health and disease. These criteria
are eminently important in establishing the social responsibilities of the
medical system. Indeed, it seems impossible to be precise on medicine’s social
tasks without such criteria.
This point can be illustrated using two examples from the problematic field
of extended medical treatment, symbolising the continuing expansion
of medicine in the future: cosmetic surgery and sex-change operations.
According to an objective understanding of health, these interventions are
indicated as long as a physical or mental functional disorder exists, for
example an ‘‘unnatural’’ distortion of the face or real suffering in connection
with one’s biological sex. If we ignore the objectifiability of these disturbances
and concentrate instead on the mere ‘‘undesirability’’ of negative states or the
mere ‘‘desirability’’ of positive ones, we lose sight of any limitations as to
what could not become the subject of medical treatment. The fact that in a
liberal society this kind of consumer-orientated medicine could well be
politically tolerated, even if it contributed to enforcing patient neuroses rather
than curing them, is not in itself a reason to relinquish objective views of
health and disease as points of medical orientation.
Thus an objective understanding of disease seems to be of practical
importance: but is it theoretically justifiable? What other objectification
attempt could be substituted for the biostatistical attempt? Like Nordenfelt
(1987) I too believe that health should be comprehended as a fundamental
ability to act and disease as an absence of this ability.10 This interpretation
seems reasonable because bodily functions can only be collectively appraised
within the framework of abilities to act. To this extent my interpretation seems
inevitable. And yet what exactly are fundamental abilities to act? This concept
could either mean a class X referring to a group of fundamental abilities, or a
class X referring to a group of abilities, the fundamental quality of which
needs to be defined. It is the second of these alternatives which is closer to the
truth, meaning that we require two different kinds of information. We have to
find out which abilities to act are fundamental and to what degree they have to
be mastered as fundamental abilities.
One method of presenting abilities to act in these two dimensions more
precisely could be as follows: firstly, to formulate the list mentioned earlier. It
contains abilities which are prerequisites for a good human life, but which
do not provide complete characterisation of that life. A line is drawn here
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between well-being or happiness on the one hand and the biological
prerequisites for them on the other, meant in a broad sense not reduced to
functions alone. Secondly, definition of degree. As actions indicative of
health, the abilities thus distinguished must be mastered to the degree that they
really do provide the agent with his or her options to act. The criterion for
degree is the difference between potential and actualisation. This difference is
bound to actions and can only be made both more concrete and precise in
connection with actions.
Health as a fundamental ability to act is an idea of health which adopts a
position between health as an ability to function (Boorse) and health as the
good life or happiness (WHO definition). The abilities to act concept is
the appropriate level of specification because, firstly, it permits evaluation
of which bodily functions have to be how in order to contribute to human
well-being and because, secondly, they can exist without having to be good or
in any way applied. A person has the potential to run if he or she has the ability
to act in this way. What that person does with this ability is no longer a
question of health, but of personal lifestyle under the special social
circumstances.
Thinking and walking are certainly both actions within the group of actions
relevant to health. One is only healthy if one can think and walk – in the sense
that one has the ability to carry out the actions pertaining to thinking and
walking if one wishes to. There are different manners of thinking and walking,
though. A further differentiation within these abilities to think and walk
requires functional medical knowledge about neurological and physiological
disturbances in the brain and legs. The functional analysis of body and soul
cannot be substituted, only enlarged upon. The difference between potential
and actual abilities to act should be able to withstand even this definitional
restraint. Thinking concentratedly is potential, thinking precisely is actual
realisation and has to be learnt; walking without pain is potential, walking
carefully is actual realisation.
My proposal may be summarised as follows: health is a potential to act at
our disposal, referring to actions which in turn are prerequisites for a good
life. Disease is the breakdown of this potential. Although different in the
longer term, health and disease do not have to be easily visible at any given
moment. This is not true of physical beauty and ugliness. Despite this
limitation it seems reasonable, at least following the assumptions made earlier
on about the origins of value – and beauty like health is a type of value – that
structural analogies and dependencies exist between physical health and
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beauty, disease and ugliness. And yet health is not the same as beauty. What
exactly is then the relationship between health and beauty?
III. BEAUTY, PURPOSES AND HAPPINESS
Let us begin with general statements. Things are beautiful if they visibly fulfil
their purpose. Artefacts are beautiful when they fulfil the purpose for which
they were constructed, natural things beautiful when they fulfil the purpose
corresponding to or arising from their natural organisation. Snakes are
accordingly beautiful because of the suppleness of their bodies, seagulls
because of their ability to change direction suddenly even in strong winds,
elephants because of the way their sheer mass asserts itself against the
environment. This explanation becomes increasingly unsatisfactory the less
directly an artefact or creature is connected with a single purpose. It is far
more difficult to deduce the beauty of elephants or dogs from their purpose
since they have a variety of purposes or goals in life. In the same way, maybe
one explanation why modern racing cars do not appear as beautiful as older
ones is because they are no longer supposed to be just fast, but also good at
accelerating, safe, light and many other things besides. Their essential
characteristics have practically ceased to be visible. Human beings represent
the most extreme case in this respect: they seek their own purposes and we
observed this attribution of purpose to be open. How can human beings be
beautiful then?
These considerations introduce a ‘‘teleological’’ perception of beauty, the
motives of which follow on from the origins of the value inherent in abilities
outlined at the beginning of this sketch.11 Abilities are always abilities to do
something or abilities to act, and actions are also always directed towards
something, a purpose. It is not clear, however, just how beauty, abilities and
purposes are connected. And yet a link between beauty and purposes, which
some of our intuitions permit us to comprehend, will come as no surprise if we
assume that beauty is a value and, like other values, can only emerge from
abilities. A more precise analysis of this assumption regarding beauty naturally
presupposes that we wish to and must view beauty normatively, that beauty can
exist in ideal forms and that all versions of realism or intuitionism are just as
unconvincing with regard to beauty as to morality. ‘‘Aesthetic facts’’ are
ontologically just as problematic as ‘‘moral facts’’. Like ethics, aesthetics has
to be able to explain the connection between beauty and other real things.
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And yet we find not only human beings beautiful, but also objects and
phenomena, especially artificial and natural things. Since artificial things are
man-made and natural things given, the relationships between the purposes
behind things and the actions associated with them must be different. The
purpose of a pencil is the action we can perform with it, but the purpose of a
snake is not a comparable action. Since Darwin we believe that nature knows
no purposes and that apparent purposefulness is the result of selection
controlled by success, so that the purposefulness of natural things can only be
taken less literally: if we view the body of the snake as having a purpose, we
fictitiously render the snake the subject of its own action. It would have
constructed its body thus if it could have done so. In general terms, we
perceive the beauty of natural objects by projecting semi-human intents and
purposes onto them. Our partially shared biology makes it fairly easy to
recognise patterns of purpose in biology which we consciously follow in our
human lives.
To a certain extent, human bodies are located between natural and artificial
things. On the one hand, human bodies are of course like the bodies of other
biological creatures too. Underlying their biology is a natural history un-
influenced by human purposes. On the other hand, they bear an artificial
element, in that over a longer period of time the activities of a body owner take
an effect on his or her body, not to mention the body-shaping activities now
common which impress themselves on the body directly. These two aspects
correspond to two ways in which the body can be seen as purposeful. The first
way is the ‘‘quasi-teleological’’ view, according to which bodies are seen as
artefacts even though they are not. They are viewed as if they were constructed
things, with a simultaneous awareness that they are not. The extent to which
this quasi-teleological view of things makes sense is open to criticism. I shall
return to this point shortly. The second way corresponds to the extent to which
the body can actually be shaped. In this case the most general norms of human
action we know become relevant to the body. These most general norms are
the ways in which human action is good or, in the Aristotelian sense, in which
it is ‘‘virtuous’’. The second way of viewing the body is thus the virtue-
orientated view.
And yet neither the quasi-teleological nor the virtue-orientated view appear
to explain why we use the expression ‘‘beautiful’’. They seem to offer a
substitution for beauty rather than provide a yardstick for beauty. This is clear
from the way that a racing car is beautiful because its ability to be fast is
apparent. The beauty of the car lies not in its speed, but in its expression of the
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same, in its shape suggestive of speed. The car could actually be quite slow
without losing its aesthetic character. The relationship between beauty and
purpose is therefore indirect in at least two ways. Firstly, the characteristic of
being beautiful refers to the external appearance of a thing and not necessarily
to the whole thing. The more the function of the thing captures the com-
position of the thing, the more it will be beautiful as a whole thing. Otherwise,
as is typical with human beings, beauty will only be an external feature, not at
all representative of the thing as a whole.
Secondly, the appearance or external form is not in itself the purpose or
function it indicates. It symbolises this purpose, points to it. The way in which
that is possible is differently given depending on the purpose, by the con-
ditions for that purpose succeeding. Symbolisation can also exceed these
conditions. The best symbolisation is not necessarily the ‘‘most real’’, i.e., the
one corresponding to the most purposeful form. The shape of the old racing
car symbolises speed much better than the new one, although the old design is
technically inferior to the new one.
So much for the definition that beauty lies in the symbolic power of a
purposeful appearance. And yet this formulation says nothing about the extent
to which beauty has its own value dimension which cannot be reduced to the
value of the corresponding purpose or be completely deduced from the latter.
Beauty could still, taking its value, coincide with purposefulness or the value
of the purpose in question. Especially if we share the background assumption
that all valuableness must stem from one single value dimension, namely that
of human abilities, a reductionistic understanding of beauty, as of all aesthetic
characteristics, seems reasonable.12 The non-reductionistic alternative would
be to see symbolisation as having a value in its own right which can be
reduced no further.
This can be illustrated using Stendhal’s more precise formulation, ac-
cording to which beauty is a ‘‘promise’’ of happiness.13 This turn of phrase
on the one hand involves what the reductionists also claim, namely that
happiness has particular contents which can be distinguished from others. Not
just any appearance can promise happiness, rendering differing appearances
different in their degrees of beauty or ugliness. On the other hand, the
structural and symbolic anticipation of happiness involves a value in its own
right, just as a promise is usually worth less than what is promised, but without
in itself being worthless. Even more than with a promise, beauty could
be interpreted as a partial anticipation of happiness. Because notions and
experiences of happiness are both hazy and diverse, its symbolic anticipation
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can assume both very clear and very vague forms, and as such is notoriously
contentious. This is precisely the case in our everyday encounters with beauty.
An improved definition of beauty would then be that beauty is the symbolic
power of a purposeful appearance which indicates or anticipates happiness.
A more general version of this view would relinquish purposefulness as
an element. This broader, ‘‘eudaemonistic’’ definition of beauty corresponds
directly to Stendhal’s words. It is true that purposefulness is especially
relevant to the external design of natural and artificial things, and thus also for
their beauty or ugliness, but happiness cannot be reduced to purposefulness.
Virtuousness is only purposeful in the broadest sense, and yet it is still a
necessary element of happiness only. Ultimately, success and, even more
generally speaking, everything which happens to someone is also a necessary
element of that person’s happiness and certainly something which does not
just follow on from purposes behind actions, or at least not directly.
Within the framework of the eudaemonistic view of beauty, it can simply be
left up to general experience which appearances are capable of indicating or
anticipating happiness. Clear water, bread, a green meadow, a baby, dewdrops
on a rose are all undisputed symbols of life, for example, each one of them
beautiful, whereas old car tyres, dried-up plants, a burnt-out house, spilt milk,
a ravaged face are all symbols of destruction, each one of them ugly. The
eudaemonistic comprehension of beauty does not rule out being able to find
old car tyres or burnt-out houses beautiful in principle, but in order to do so a
link must be found to a vision of what is positive, what is conducive to human
life. Since human and, generally speaking, all forms of biological life include
a development towards death, happiness is not limited to the things associated
with the beginnings or openness of life either.
Anybody unconvinced by the examples just cited is maybe concerned with
the difference between beautiful things and beautiful pictures. When the twin
towers of the World Trade Center were destroyed, the media immediately
swamped us with countless ‘‘beautiful’’ pictures: bizarrely warped steel
foundations, firemen seemingly dusted in flour, papers fluttering through the
streets, etc. Beautiful pictures of destruction are obviously possible, but they
are not pictures in which destruction is visible. Beautiful pictures of
destruction deny the destruction itself, are beautiful pictures of things which
are not beautiful. Beautiful pictures can be created by adopting a certain angle
and ultimately by adopting a certain attitude of mind, by seeing or choosing
not to see what is real. The papers scattered throughout the streets fool us into
forgetting that they have come from a building which has just exploded, the
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grey dusty faces conjur up images of bakeries, etc. And yet what should
interest us is the beauty of things, and not of pictures, for the latter’s quality
can only be measured against the quality of things.
IV. BODY PURPOSES AND PHYSICAL BEAUTY
In what follows I shall predominantly limit myself to the teleological view of
beauty, as applied to the human body. When is a body beautiful, when is it not
beautiful or even ugly? (I use ‘‘ugly’’ as the superlative of ‘‘not beautiful’’.) As
I have already stated, two levels at which bodies can be viewed teleologically
in a broad sense of the word are the quasi-teleological level and the virtue-
orientated level. In line with the first way of thinking, the body is viewed as
though it were constructed according to a purpose; in line with the second way
it is viewed according to the extent to which it symbolises human virtues.
Virtuousness is an orientation towards purpose in a broader sense because
human beings require virtues in order to pursue their purposes.
But the body is also a biological body and the first, quasi-teleological view
is not rendered superfluous by the second, virtue-orientated view. The
difference is to be found in the fact that virtues take effect within the
framework of the naturally given, being unrelentlessly conditioned by this.
Our biological body is part of the naturally given – and we can also ask of our
body whether or why it is beautiful. The quasi-teleological view cannot be
disregarded for precisely this reason.
This viewpoint is called ‘‘quasi’’ teleological because it is only based on
‘‘as if’’ purposes and not on the real purposes of real agents (for example,
a divine designer). If we look more closely, this attempt to rescue the
purposefulness of the biological body now seems able to succeed for its
internal structure, but not for the overall body or for its overall design. The
same doubts would also be true with regard to other biological creatures, so
that to a certain degree Kant’s theory of the purposelessness of the beautiful
comes into its own here, albeit differently from how he saw it.14
Internal purposefulness is concerned with how the parts of the body are
interlinked or related to each other. We know that this internal functional
coherence is linked to our experience of beauty, not only from our direct
contemplations, but also from well-known historical attempts to find formulae
for ideal proportions between body parts. The biological components of the
body, like blood cells, muscles, bones or organs, are only beautiful when they
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are recognisable in their functional context. X-ray pictures, microscopic
smears or blood samples are as aesthetically neutral as a slice of bread or a
piece of coal. An amputated arm is a neutral thing. In contrast, an arm which
can turn around its axis at the shoulder joint is aesthetically pleasing. All
destructions of the human body are ugly, and all of them impair the functional
context of the body.
Various artists like Leonardo and D€urer, different architects and mathe-
maticians have undertaken diverse arithmetical and geometrical
attempts to record the proportions of the limbs, of the upper body and the
torso, of the head to overall height, of the various parts of the face.15 These
attempts could at best be interpreted as attempts to bring coherence to the
proportionality of the body. According to which other criteria should
proportionality be evaluated though, if not the functionality of body parts
within the framework of the overall organism? A particular length, division
and movement of the arms, for example, is most favourable in conjunction
with a particular overall body size. Arm and leg lengths have to be in
proportion if both sets of limbs are to perform comparable tasks. In this
respect, the human body is biologically unique, its functions are balanced
and not specialised. Ideal proportionality therefore amounts to balanced
functionality.16
Let us now address doubts about the purposefulness of the body as a whole.
From an evolutionary point of view we could, like Boorse, turn to survival and
reproduction and assume that the body ideally fulfils these purposes. And yet
the quasi-teleological view poses difficulties in this case because it assumes
that purposes of action can be transferred to the body. If we take the body as a
whole, however, this transfer breaks down because the mere structure of these
actions in turn presuppose the human body. The quasi-teleological standpoint
is circular when applied to the body as a whole, and therefore not elucidating.
The human body and the most important human actions are mutually
conditioned. Actions we take for granted include, for example, picking things
up and holding them aloft. Our hands and arms are well suited to this purpose
and we could therefore call them beautiful when they fulfil this purpose and
ugly when they do not. It is true that the ‘‘purpose’’ of our hands and arms, in
the sense of an ability to act, consciousness, intentions, etc., is not strictly to
grasp and raise things. But our hands and arms are shaped for these types of
actions, and without the arms and hands at our disposal we would not form the
intentions, would not actually grasp and raise things. The purposefulness of
actions and of parts of the body are therefore not only linked but mutually
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dependent. This dependency is at least true for all actions based on bodily
movements. Mental actions are removed from such movements. Nevertheless,
mental and physical actions alike presuppose the body and a framework of
physically viable options. This is why we cannot construct an alternative body,
not even from the standpoint of mere mental actions.
In the face of these contemplations, two questions arise. Firstly, does this
mutual dependency not also mean that we are unable to perfect the body,
simply because we can possess no yardstick of perfection independent of the
body? For truly trenchant alterations this appears to be crucial. To the extent
that we can perceive structural alterations, as have been illustrated in diverse
books and films for example, they usually assume an animal-like specialisa-
tion: human beings with gills, with wings, with the teeth of a wolf, with the
eyes of a fly, etc. In order to think in terms of other body forms, we would have
to make fundamental changes to our human purposes of action and in life –
something that seems impossible without possession of these new forms
already, and jumping into some of them would be arbitrary.
Secondly, do we not have an impression of beauty when viewing the body
as a whole, and how is this impression to be explained if the quasi-teleological
view, being circular, does not really provide an explanation? The same is true
of animals and plants, which we also tend to view as a whole and declare
beautiful, provided they are not deformed or sick. Here it is helpful to return to
the eudaemonistic definition of beauty. The body as a whole is not an end to
other things, but – with its abilities to act – an end in itself. Kant attributed this
status only to reason, overlooking the body because he believed reason to be
ontologically independent of the body. Revising Kant’s deliberations on this
point, the body can also be deemed to be a purpose in its own right through its
reciprocal connection with abilities to act and reason. Because actions cannot
take place without the body, it is a component of this end in itself, of its
‘‘intrinsic’’ value.
Symbolisations are, of course, concrete and express this fundamental
dependency in their own way. To a certain extent, observation of the human
body anticipates what the good life could (partially) consist of for a human
being. The beauty of a body as a whole arises from a reference to the potential
physical life of that being. In the same way, when we observe a cat, a snake or
an elephant and deem them beautiful, we glance at the outlines of what life
ideally signifies for these creatures. When we find a human nude beautiful, we
have a vague vision of what it is like to live with this body. These insights
are not purposeful; we do not know which purposes will characterise this
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particular life. They are insights into the possibilities of that life, into the
outlines of what happiness can be.
The question raised at the beginning of this section was: how is the
teleological explanation to be plausible for creatures like human beings who
can confer upon themselves any number of purposes? The answer lies in
reducing these purposes to possibilities, within the framework of a materially
defined body. Mutilations or deformations of the body, considered ugly, also
comply with this explanation, restricting as they do the potential of the body in
its natural construction. A glance at a crippled leg is also a glance at a life
which will be less good, have fewer possibilities, and this is why we find it less
attractive.
V. VIRTUE AND PHYSICAL BEAUTY
The most simple teleological explanation for physical beauty would consist in
citing the natural purpose. And yet this explanation, as we have just seen, does
not do justice to the beauty of the body as a whole. I would now like to
examine another difficulty arising from an inclusion of virtues. This will be
followed by a more precise analysis of youth, slimness and shapeliness as
three stereotypical ideals of physical beauty. It is probably transparent that the
flip-side of a normative theory of beauty as outlined here amounts to a
criticism of many notions of beauty common today.
Virtues are correctives of human actions and abilities. I shall explain shortly
what exactly they are. Because virtues usually refer to actions and not to the
body, it is necessary to refrain from ambiguity when speaking of physical
beauty in this context. We can speak of how particular parts of the body
function, as well as of how the person belonging to that body, the agent, moves
his or her body. One function of the leg is stretching; the ability to stand
presupposes this function but also goes beyond it. In the first case the material
body is moving in accordance with the functions open to it, in the second case
somebody is moving his or her body. In line with my proposed terminology,
this is the difference between functions and abilities.
In the tradition of German anthropology (Plessner, Jonas, Schmitz), this
difference is also defined as that between ‘‘body’’ and ‘‘Leib’’.17 Stretching is
a function of the body, standing is a movement of the Leib. Functions are
phenomena of the body, abilities phenomena of the Leib. Leib is usually
defined as a ‘‘subjectively animate body’’, including actions in our sense of
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‘‘abilities’’. Accordingly, in conjunction with bodily functions we also have
to speak of physical events, in conjunction with Leib-based phenomena to
speak of completed actions and thus of bodily movements. Correspondingly,
aesthetic evaluations are based on different things. Standing up straight, at
ease or bobbing slightly, is considered beautiful because it expresses the
ability to be ready for action, take on tasks, possess self-confidence and self-
assurance. The stretched leg is beautiful as a function when we perceive it as
suitable for standing. The ‘‘body’’ is beautiful as a tool, a means, the Leib is
beautiful as part of a successful and good action. Here an overview:
Status Orientation Physical dynamics Direct source of beauty
Body Functions Physical events Purposes
Leib Abilities
Actions
Bodily movements Virtues
The view of beauty connected with virtues, the explanation of beauty based on
the good of human abilities, is most manifest in conjunction with bodily
movements, and standing up straight is certainly a bodily movement. Standing
is a movement because the body has to be balanced in order to stand straight
and firm. A number of movements like walking, running, jumping, hitting, etc.
could be added. Beauty can express itself more easily in these movements
because intended movements are actions, and actions directly illustrate
abilities. Expressing is not the same thing (in my use of the term), however, as
symbolising. Standing up straight expresses assurance and at the same time is
assured. A straight and strong leg symbolises assurance without having to be
assured. The connection between Leib-based phenomena and abilities and
virtues is obvious, and with it the aesthetic evaluation of the Leib. I am not
concerned here with the beauty of actions or of persons, however, but of the
body, i.e., the beauty of the mere physical form. This beauty is not as easy to
explain because of the less direct, merely symbolic relationship between the
material, external form and abilities.
Admittedly: to what extent is it even possible to view the body in
accordance with ideals of ability without viewing it as a Leib, too? Functional
observation can abstract from the Leib viewpoint because it sees the body only
as a biological construction – the point of view adopted by biologists and
pathologists.18 When, on the other hand, abilities are taken to mean abilities to
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act, then observations about abilities, including their symbolisation, presume
the existence of an agent, seemingly forcing the body into becoming the Leib.
In one fundamental sense this is correct. And yet a symbolising reference to
abilities only requires the concept of the particular abilities it then visualises.
The physical form visualises ability in a general way; application of that
ability as a movement is unnecessary. Just as the Leib is comprehended as an
animate and activated body, symbols of beauty abstract from this Leib.
Physical beauty refers to the quality of abilities or to virtues – what does
that mean? Virtues are human abilities in their ideal form. If we adhere strictly
to Aristotelian virtues, then we mean abilities referring to lifestyle, abilities
which are necessary in an average human life in order to lead a good life. They
include courage, moderation, perseverance, generosity, justice, friendship and
practical reason (moral and intellectual virtues). P. Foot (1978) has pointed out
that these abilities all require a will, that they are correctives, holding their
own against typically human weaknesses, and that precisely this link with the
will separates these abilities from physical characteristics like health, strength
or – in our case – beauty.
Virtues controlled by the will are without doubt the epitome and most
important component of our selves as agents. All other abilities which could
additionally be named require these virtues if they are to be applied well.
Because the will and self-control are at the centre of our active abilities, all
significant activities in life require these central abilities. But this does not
mean that all other abilities and characteristics are lacking in significance.
Strictly speaking, health and physical strength are not virtues because they are
not per se linked to the will. It would nevertheless be inappropriate to view
them as having no value in our lives. Were the value of acting and living to be
governed solely by the will, then this would be a very extreme standpoint
indeed.19 Virtues could therefore be viewed in a narrower and a broader
sense, with the former referring to actual virtues of action and the latter to
mental and physical abilities based on arbitrary biological manifestations like
physical strength and health, talents, psychological strengths and potentials.
These abilities, removed from total control in the broader sense of the term
virtue, are also among the qualities making up an agent.
In our context this differentiation is important because physical beauty,
were it to be understood solely as a symbolisation of virtue in a narrow sense,
would easily lose its symbolic power. Taking moderation, for example, how is
a body to represent moderation if it is not the body of someone who practises
moderation? Especially when the owner is young, a body will not necessarily
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express the characteristics of that owner, whereas even a body with the best
constitution will with time assume the features of a life that has been led
without moderation. Beauty would then cease to symbolise, instead simply
existing in the physical expression of virtue (or vice), similar to physical
movements. Symbolisation only comes into its own if virtues are included in
the broader sense of the term.
It is probably no coincidence that the facial features are more capable of
reflecting virtues in the narrower sense and the body of reflecting virtues in
the broader sense. A ‘‘virtuously symbolised’’, i.e., beautiful face, would
accordingly be one expressing the ability to form opinions and control
passions, but also joie de vivre, sympathy and benevolence. The study of
physiognomy has found, albeit somewhat controversially, facial features
corresponding to these expressions: a high forehead as an indication of
intelligence, a strong chin for vigour, a wide mouth for joie de vivre, strong
lips and cheekbones for friendliness and sensuality, etc.20 This symbolism is
based on a manifold network of associations which uses typical actions and
types of behaviour to assign to the different parts of the face appropriate
references to the quality of virtue. The mouth is associated with eating as the
absorption of vitality, the lips and cheeks are associated with tenderness, the
chin with clenched teeth, the forehead with thinking, etc.
What would the ideal, virtuously symbolised body look like? A detailed
answer depends on a more precise interpretation of the virtues involved and their
relationship to one another. A first, rough answer could be that a beautiful body
certainly requires power, strength, stamina and moderation. Height, youth and a
lack of deformity indicate strength and vitality, a proportionality of the limbs
could symbolise the universality of these abilities. Slimness symbolises self-
control, skinniness by contrast self-denial and a lack of zest, plumpness beyond
a certain point symbolises a weak will or even lethargy, or a strong will in
connection with uncontrolled pleasure-loving urges and egoism.
A detailed description of beautiful bodies could either be developed
following a more exact analysis of the virtues involved, or by taking a critical
look at the currently fashionable stereotypes of physical beauty. The latter
path seems the more viable option, especially when one has doubts about the
meaningfulness of a general ethics of anthropological virtue. Which of the
stereotypes known to us can be justified rationally in the sense proposed here?
We could start by observing that stereotypes urge us to standardise physical
beauty, whereas a less stereotypical view would permit different combinations
of symbolised virtues. Analogous to this, Aristotelian ethics is dominated by a
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pluralism of virtue combinations. Let us take a closer look at three concrete
manifestations affecting the beauty of bodies: youthfulness and age, slimness
and strength, shapeliness and deformity.
A. Youthfulness
We often think that a younger body, ideally that of a healthy 20-year old, is
more beautiful than an older one, but that the way the older one is more able to
express the person inside it renders it more beautiful. This latter point is a
phenomenon of the Leib, and I should like to abstract from it. Taking physical
appearance on its own, the quasi-teleological view would confirm youth as
a constituent of physical beauty. Youthful bodies obviously fulfil their
biological purposes better than older or old ones. Just like the bodywork of the
racing car symbolising speed: the firmness, freshness and hue of the young
body even symbolise biological vitality when the person in question is already
dying of a disease not yet apparent. Visible vitality promises the good life and
as such is beautiful.
If we only think in terms of the biological body and the person-related Leib,
this devaluing of old bodies can only be countered by the comfort that they
express the virtues of the older person far more extensively.21 The quasi-
teleological view of beauty is only one view, however, and the virtue-
orientated view should not be forgotten at this point, addressing physical form
and not physical movements. As we saw earlier, the physical form symbolises
traits of character and virtues in various ways. If our evaluation of straight
noses or full lips is only to be taken in this context, why should biographical
development and application of the virtues themselves not play a role? Virtues
are the abilities of an agent with a life history, and ideally they are not lesser
(or greater) in old age than in youth. Ideally, virtues are ‘‘adequate relative to
age,’’ that is in harmony with the inevitable process of human ageing. The
quasi-teleological view and the virtue-orientated view therefore conflict with
each other: the former champions youth, the latter champions adequacy
relative to age.
Within this conflict, the virtue-orientated view should be deemed the
more important because, compared to biological functions, human abilities
generally represent the more important reservoir of meaning. One could
assume that the difficulty we may have with finding older bodies beautiful is
simply due to the influence of body-cult industries which for economic
reasons have elevated youthfulness to such an ideal (the ideal of adequacy
relative to age would not earn them as much). This explanation is not quite
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correct because the ideal of a good life relative to age is not independent of the
biological conditions of life, and these conditions have improved dramatically,
at least in the rich western societies. Only an ideal of life relative to age which
is independent of biological existence would permit symbolisation of this
ideal within the body to prevail without contest. Such an ideal can hardly be
formulated, however, which is why this conflict between the body ideals of
youthfulness and those relative to age remains unsolved.
B. Slimness
The conflict between the quasi-teleological view and the virtue-orientated
view is continued in the slimness ideal, since the way in which this ideal
is currently interpreted in western culture elevates the natural (healthy)
constitution of 20-year olds to the only stereotype. Many human beings,
especially women, are extensively occupied with orienting their bodies
towards this stereotype as they get older (for more detail see Posch, 1999, pp.
48–72). Pregnancies and careers make this fairly difficult for the majority of
them. Here too, an alternative to the biological view would be a view of
slimness relative to age. This would be expressed by a robuster or heavier
body (not one-sidedly deformed as a result of particular activities) that does
not correspond to the fat-free and firm body of a 20-year old. Turning this
argument on its head, a body that is inappropriately slim for its age symbolises
not only one-sided self-deprivation, but also a refusal to accept the ageing
process bordering on self-deception.
C. Shapeliness
As with youthfulness, the quasi-teleological view supports shapeliness. In
contrast to youthfulness, virtuous symbolism hardly provides a compensation.
Shapeliness is always beautiful, deformity always ugly. We only have to think
of bodies with brittle-bone disease or fingers bent by rheumatism. If a tall,
straight and strong body is beautiful because of these features, a small,
crooked and weak body cannot also be beautiful. If it is deemed to be beautiful
nevertheless, then this will be due to something other than the body, usually
the Leib, i.e., the person behind the body. (This is why it is possible to
find even a physically very deformed person beautiful after a period of
accustomisation.)
In addition to personal beauty, the imagery of beauty may also play a role.
A bent finger may appear beautiful because it is so perfectly curved, a scar for
its clear geometric pattern, etc. In these cases we do not see a beautiful body or
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a beautiful part of the body, but beauty in the body. Purpose-free observation
does not draw upon other sources either, a glance at how it is to live with a
body not necessarily inferring happiness. The difficulty we experience when
trying to find a deformed body beautiful is of course a consequence of this
whole attempt at an explanation. A body can only be found beautiful to the
extent to which it can symbolise abilities. A damaged body will still be
capable of doing this, but nearly always to a lesser degree than a healthy body.
It will therefore usually be less beautiful.
With all three ideals it should be noted that – disregarding personal beauty
or beauty of the Leib – a physical assymetry exists between the potential of the
face and of the rest of the body to be beautiful. The face comes closer to
virtues than the rest of the body. Because of its complexity, it has a far larger
range of symbolisation at its disposal than the body, which is really
astonishing considering the discrepancy in their sizes. Maybe this is why the
ugliness of a deformed body can be neutralised or even compensated by a
beautiful face. It is far more difficult to offset a not very beautiful or even ugly
face with a beautiful body. A beautiful body can distract from an ugly face
without making it any more acceptable.
VI. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF A GOOD BODY
Bodies can be healthy and beautiful. We all think it important to have healthy
bodies, and not unimportant to have beautiful ones. And yet just how
important is beauty, for example compared to health, with which it is
increasingly conflicting in contexts like cosmetic surgery? In order to answer
this question, we have to comprehend more fully why our bodies are important
or, to put it more technically, how a healthy body comes to have a value. Why
is health valuable?
According to one view which is widespread even amongst philosophers,
health only has an instrumental value.22 This means that health possesses a
value as a means for other goods in life and is only as good or as bad as these
goods. Analogous to this is the view that the value of physical beauty is to gain
social recognition and especially wealth (see Etcoff, 1999, chap. 2). We
vaguely suspect that at least beauty cannot be reduced to an instrumental
value. A beautiful face is not a selling point because it sells well. Its beauty
consists not merely in the fact that it makes money, otherwise nobody would
know why they buy beauty. Examining this suspicion more deeply reveals that
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the instrumental way of thinking is in both cases completely misleading and
wrong!
If we view the body predominantly from the aspect of abilities, human
characteristics cannot be divided into two groups, with one group being
instrumentally good for the other. This is clear for the relationships existing
within an ability. Abilities can be developed to different extents and yet the
weaker development is not good for the stronger development, but is its
beginning. It seems feasible that some abilities could be instrumentally good
for other abilities until we look at them more closely. Those abilities which
could be suited to such an instrumental relationship quickly prove not to be.
Health could be good – this is roughly how we would have to put it – for
earning an income. This relationship would be instrumental if health then
possessed its only value from that income. And that is absurd. Health cannot
be expressed in terms of money, health is worth far more than money or is
worthy in a different way. And the same is true on closer observation of all
other comparable instrumental reasons, rendering health not the means for
other goods, but the prerequisite.
The idea of health and beauty having instrumental values can only take hold
if we believe these goods to be more or less random, external human
characteristics. A substance-dualistic philosophy seduces one to this view.
According to Descartes and Locke, a person cannot be defined by his or her
physical qualities, but only by his or her existence as a mental person. Physical
health and beauty are thus external to the person. When people have them at
their disposal they can do something with them, like make money from them.
But surely substance dualism is not tenable. Mental characteristics as such
require a body. With the differentiation between body and Leib, this also
means that the physical qualities health and beauty are not features which are
particularistically person-related.23
Comprehending health as a fundamental ability to act, it seems more
reasonable to view health as an intrinsic good. If health lies in the potential of
actions which are prerequisites for a good life, then the relationship between
health and all other human goods – i.e., all things which can be good for
human beings – is surely not an instrumental, but a constitutive one. Health
facilitates all things in life which are good, without being identified as the
same. In a global sense, health has such an outstanding value because all other
goods are only possible as a result.
When we normally ask how much health is ‘‘worth’’, we hardly mean
health in a global sense, completely encompassing our physical and mental
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existence as agents. We refer instead to particular functional restrictions which
reduce our potentials to act. Objectively speaking, the meaning of health and
disease, the value of health, the demerits of disease or damage are all
established in very limited terms, namely the functions and abilities affected
and their relative importance to others. The demerits of the damage depend in
each case on the merits or demerits possessed by the potentials to act in our
individual lives, or the merits or demerits we choose to give them, be it
fundamentally or at a particular period in time. Actual health is as valuable as
we make it; actual disease is as harmful as we are forced to allow it to invade
our lives.
Where does the intrinsic value of beauty lie, and how is it to be viewed in
comparison with other values? More so than with health, in our everyday
dealings with beauty we waver between two extremes, namely complete
devaluation of physical beauty and instrumental high regard. This wavering
is due to an influential, one-sidedly mentalistic concept of the person
especially persistent in Christian culture, together with the view that physical
beauty is unearned and thus without value. Instrumental regard does not
have to be of a purely economic nature; it could also refer to the ability of
beauty to arouse desire and joy. Physical beauty would then derive its value
from the fact that it brings joy to others, as well as to the beautiful person in
question.
Although it is the most plausible kind of esteem, this last interpretation also
comes up against a well-known objection to hedonism: it is unable to explain
just why beauty is capable of giving pleasure. It is more or less beyond doubt
that beauty does give joy, but an instrumental evaluation of beauty along these
lines should also include an explanation of why beauty gives joy and not
simply postulate it. Only a conceptual analysis of beauty will be able to
provide an answer, and only if criteria are also established as to what
constitutes beauty. In my view, the analysis I have proposed is certainly suited
to this purpose. If physical beauty is a symbolic reference to elements of the
good life, it is easy to see why the contemplation of beautiful physical
attributes arouses joy and desire in the way experience has taught us. In
addition, a version of the good life based on virtues has provided us with
criteria enabling us to adopt a critical stance towards our practised and
stereotypical perceptions of beauty.
In comparison, beauty is thus less valuable than health and the elements of
the good life to which it refers, simply because it can only refer and not
express. Beauty is an extra, to the extent that it translates real elements of
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happiness into perceivable visions, or anticipates and symbolises them. The
more it succeeds in this, the more dangerous it becomes because it can easily
be confused with happiness itself. When happiness is symbolised with
complete success it is easy to forget that it is just a symbolisation. On the other
hand, it is also an indication that happiness really can exist, at least as a
fundamentally realisable, albeit not easily realised state. It makes a credible
promise or gives hope.
Two practical conclusions are reasonable to assume. Firstly, one should not
endeavour to create beauty at the price of health. Certain excesses of aesthetic
body design are sometimes admired because a person is unwaveringly
following his ideals at a high risk to him or herself. In the cold light of day, it is
really a special type of self-mutilation and denial. Radical aestheticism is
irrational when it slights health, the prerequisite of beauty.
Secondly, beauty should not be pursued for its own sake. This conclusion is
not to be taken strictly, but to the extent suggested by the symbolisation of
good within beauty. Symbolisations are as good as they are required to be.
They do not have any original intrinsic value. And yet a symbol is usually
easier to create than whatever it is meant to symbolise. Children can live with
the fantasy that their toy money is real money, or at least as valuable as real
money. In reality symbols are always worth less than the objects they
symbolise. If a symbol is easier to create than the object, it is easy to dedicate
oneself falsely to the symbol. In principle there is nothing wrong with taking
great effort to make or keep one’s body beautiful. But we should never forget
that a beautiful body is only an image of those goods which we are really
supposed to be attaining. When it comes to the crunch, those goods are more
important.
When the value of symbols is high, as is the case with medals for bravery,
then this is only because of what they stand for. The high value of the medal is
of course not for its general reference to the virtue ‘‘bravery’’, but for its
reference to an act of bravery which has actually taken place. In the same way
as this real and individual act is necessary in order to show the value of a
virtue, beauty cannot have a high value when it only refers to virtues in
general. It could only attain a comparably high value (akin to the act meriting
a medal) if it were to refer to real actions. And the person who is beautiful will
not be able to ascribe such actions to him or herself in advance. The beautiful
person has to learn how to realise them first. Beauty thus remains a hope and is
only as valuable in each individual case as the extent to which that hope proves
justified.
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NOTES
1. See Brumberg (1988) and Bordo (1993) for the former, Gilmore (1994) for the latter. In the
current debate, the ‘socio-constructive’ aspect of disease has far more weight, however,
than the anthropologically-universal one. Explanations for anorexia and bulimia which are
not culturally-sociological almost seem to be under the pressure of self-legitimization. For
the usual culturalist approach see e.g., Winkler & Cole (1994).
2. Especially with M. Nussbaum, A. Sen, G. Cohen, R. Arneson and others. These philosophers
concentrate on the significance of our abilities with regard to justice, and do not necessarily
concern themselves with more general anthropological considerations. L. Nordenfelt uses
abilities to support his theory of health. For an overview see Schramme (2000, pp. 154–159,
pp. 193–200). In contrast, many feminists make the mistake within their socio-constructivist
analyses of believing that they could survive without ideal/normative foundations. See e.g.,
Bordo (1993, 1999); Davis (1995); Posch (1999); Winkler (1994).
3. Can there be such a thing as vague facts? Potentials are not vague, but sources of different
developments. The extent and structure of these developments cannot be precisely stated.
The existence of a potential is certainly a fact. We can normally ascertain whether
somebody has the potential to be a good swimmer, for example. But the object of a fact
is not necessarily a fact itself.
4. It seems reasonable to claim that mental abilities exceed mental functions to the extent that
it is no longer appropriate to speak of limitation. For example, we can construct machines
which operate beyond our mental functions, e.g., computers with fast processors and good
memories. A second-level limitation underlies this extension though, with qualities from
our thought processes being transferred to machines, which in turn are conditioned by our
functions.
5. This would be different if we took a concept of morality as for example Kant’s, which
includes obligations towards oneself. The part of morality aimed at the self is, however,
also included in the concept of virtue for beautiful bodies, addressed in this article later on.
6. Once again, this debate has followed the well-known alternatives: are the criteria for health
and disease naturally-empirical or socially-evaluative? Is health a collection of facts to be
discovered or a collection of norms which are to be invented, or have already been invented?
This is the famous debate between ‘‘naturalists’’ and ‘‘constructivists’’ or ‘‘normativists’’.
C. Boorse was and is the most important naturalistic proponent in this debate, whereas H. T.
Engelhardt or P. Sedgwick are rather meek proponents of such notoriously wide-ranging
socio-constructive views as are known to come from M. Foucault or (less so) I. H. Hacking.
For reports on this debate see Boorse (1987, pp. 366–369; 1997, pp. 4–5); Reznek (1987,
chap.1); Schramme (2000, chap.4). For Hacking see (1989; 1999, chap.4).
7. For a theory of disease pertaining to suffering, see e.g. Cassell (1991).
8. ‘‘Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not just the
absence of disease and infirmity.’’
9. These presuppositions include a) that the functional goals can be limited to those two
named or that they themselves can be empirically ascertained and b) that the formation of
classes of reference does not exceed the degree of conventional evaluative presuppositions
essential to the empirical sciences.
10. I would not like to follow, however, Nordenfelt’s views of the exact relationship between
health and disease (1987, pp. 65–80). See Schramme (2000, pp. 154–158), for a critique.
216 ANTON LEIST
Neither does his attempt seem tempting to me to elaborate on abilities via goals of
minimalistic welfare and not, as I suggest, by looking more closely on abilities per se.
11. As could be expected from an Aristotelian, Thomas Aquinas was one of the first to
advocate teleological aesthetics of the organism, albeit in scattered asides and not as a
systematic theory. See Eco (1987, chap. 8).
12. Hume put forward such a definition for both morality and aesthetics. Since the teleological
view of beauty proposed here shares Hume’s anti-realism, a stronger dissociation from
Hume would be necessary. For a defence of Hume’s aesthetics, see Railton (1998). For
criticism against Hume see Kant (CJ xx12–14).
13. ‘‘La beaute est une promesse de bonheur.’’
14. Kant suggested a similar idea of beauty that he called ‘‘annexed beauty’’, contrasting it
with his foremost ideal of a ‘‘pure’’ or ‘‘free’’ beauty. He explains the latter from a
purposefulness without concrete purposes. It is impossible to do justice to his theory here,
which is obviously also of a teleological cast. See CJ, xx1–22, esp. xx10–17.
15. For a contemporary attempt to measure the face in this way, see Schmidhuber (1998).
16. This biological explanation is still shrouded by the above mentioned symbolisation of
various virtues and physical abilities. We find overly long and thus disproportional legs
more beautiful than simply long legs, especially in women, a longer neck more beautiful
than a short one, etc. Biological or functional explanations cease to be helpful in such
cases; in functional terms a longer neck could even be disadvantageous. Functional
explanations for evaluations or beauty are particularly weak in conjunction with the
face, for a fat, bulbous nose can be just as functional as a slim one, which will generally be
considered more beautiful. For the face in particular, but also for other parts of the body, the
symbolisation of abilities plays a far greater role, exceeding mere physical functionality.
17. The German word ‘‘Leib’’ has no adequate English translation other than ‘‘body’’, which is
already used extensively in the English text as the translation of ‘‘K€orper’’. As stated in the
text, ‘‘Leib’’ means more than body in a pathological sense: it is an animate body, the
encasement of a person.
18. This abstraction is harder for the face than for the rest of the body. It is difficult to observe
Madonna’s facial features (pointed chin, short nose, low forehead) without the impression
of a slightly fanatical severity emerging, or the round and elderly features of the Pope
without his withdrawn inwardness taking over.
19. On closer inspection, this extreme becomes no less peculiar in the knowledge that it
corresponds to Kant’s theory of values. According to Kant, the value of actions can only be
found in practical reason or ‘‘good will’’.
20. Physiognomy, like common opinion, has falsely identified the outward appearance of the
face with actual traits of character. Taking naturally given features like high cheekbones or
a long nose, this amounts to a kind of ‘‘character-based racism’’. A similar ‘‘beauty-based
racism’’, the theory that beauty corresponds to good traits of character, is also rife,
especially amongst sociobiologists: see e.g., the sociobiologist Etcoff (1999), or for
common opinions Gilmore (1994). Overviews on the history of physiognomy can be
found in Blankenburg (1989) and Schm€olders (1995).
21. When they are expressed: not all people are more virtuous in old age than previously, many
have simply become more passive. Many are just as mentally ruined as they are physically
wrecked. A certain physical visualisation of this situation could be thought to be ‘‘beautiful’’.
If so, then at least according to the eudaemonistic interpretation of beauty, such a visualisation
of old age or even death would have to reveal something good about these situations.
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22. ‘‘Health itself, we sometimes need reminding, is a means and not an end. We can do
nothing with good health itself; it makes other goods possible’’ (Callahan, 1987, p. 81).
23. This sounds like a relapse into substance dualism. And yet it is possible to concede the
bodily existence of a person without having to link it to a particular, for example healthy
and beautiful body. Functionalist mentalism allows such a relation.
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